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RECONSTRUCTING AN ADMINISTRATIVE REPUBLIC
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski*
Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat to the Ameri-
can Republic. By Jon D. Michaels. Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press. 2017. Pp. viii, 232. $35.
Introduction
Something is rotten in the state of administrative law. This sentiment is
not uncommon in contemporary scholarship, though it usually arises from
the political or jurisprudential right. Administrative law is “unlawful”;1 the
rise of the administrative state proliferates “quasi-law” and undermines our
polity’s constitutional morality;2 and “bureaucracy in America” betrays our
Republic’s central governing principles.3 More broadly, scholars express a
looming sense of ill ease with the current dispensation, marked by a lamen-
tation for what has been lost and a call for its restoration.
With the publication of Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat to the
American Republic, we can add Professor Jon D. Michaels4 to the litany of
the discontented, but with a twist. Michaels is not a libertarian seeking to
roll back the administrative state, an avid federalist hoping to devolve gov-
erning function to states and local communities, or an originalist aspiring to
restore the premodern constitutional regime. Yet he too seeks to undo a
betrayal of our constitutional order. For Michaels, the lost regime is what he
calls the pax administrativa, an era in which governing arrangements recon-
ciled the administrative state with our core constitutional commitments to
checks and balances and separation of powers (pp. 15–16). The usurper here
is pervasive privatization within the administrative state.5
Michaels argues that privatization—whether through contracting out
key government functions or “marketizing” the bureaucracy—upsets this
delicate balance and is constitutionally illegitimate (pp. 54–57, 135). Today’s
junta is not dressed in military fatigues and does not tote guns but rather
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to Sam Bray, Emily Bremer,
Paul Miller, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
1. Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014).
2. Bruce P. Frohnen & George W. Carey, Constitutional Morality and the
Rise of Quasi-Law (2016).
3. Joseph Postell, Bureaucracy in America: The Administrative State’s Chal-
lenge to Constitutional Government (2017).
4. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
5. P. 57 (“[O]nly through understanding and appreciating pax administrativa as consti-
tutionally grounded can we see privatization the way Hamlet came to see his uncle: as a false
and illegitimate usurper.”).
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arrives in a three-piece suit armed with a PowerPoint plan to run the gov-
ernment like a business. Constitutional Coup identifies the rise of the pax
administrativa, diagnoses its downfall, and offers a plan to restore the consti-
tutional order we lost.
Constitutional Coup offers a learned, lucid, and important argument
about the relationship between privatization, constitutional structure, and
public values. Defenders and critics of the contemporary administrative state
alike will profit from engaging with Michaels’s innovative work. This eview
will introduce readers to his argument and then will raise two kinds of ques-
tions about it. First, will Michaels’s method of constitutional interpretation
and doctrinal analysis accelerate the trend toward privatization and consoli-
dation of power in agency heads, the very evils he seeks to avoid? Second, is
Michaels’s version of separated powers within the administrative state a wor-
thy successor to the original, and more formal, three-branch version?
Neither set of questions admits of easy answers, and even those who
disagree with Michaels’s conclusions should readily accede that he clarifies
and enriches our understanding of the normative choices and dilemmas the
modern administrative state raises. Constitutional formalists, progressives,
and libertarians alike should fear undifferentiated massing of power in the
executive branch, a consolidation enabled by a force-multiplying phalanx of
federal contractors. For those convinced of the gravity of this situation, the
question remains how to address it, and Michaels offers a powerful opening
shot.
I. Restoring the Pax Administrativa
Constitutional Coup proceeds in three steps. First, it catalogues the rise
of the administrative state in America and identifies a period of time in
which this regime was congruent with our country’s constitutional commit-
ments (pp. 21–77). Nothing gold can last, however, and this pax administra-
tiva was not long for this world. In the second part of the book, Michaels
traces its downfall and the concomitant rise of privatization in the adminis-
trative state (pp. 79–141). In the last part of the book, Michaels offers a suite
of doctrinal and legislative proposals to restore the administrative republic
vanquished by privatization (pp. 143–230).
The first part of Constitutional Coup lays down the book’s historical
foundation and erects its evaluative framework. Building on a rich literature
on privatization, to which he is an important contributor,6 Michaels
presents a brisk overview of the role that private actors played in the federal
government before the rise of the modern administrative state (pp. 24–27).
Michaels offers this parade of privateers, tax ferrets, and Pinkertons not as
precedent to justify contemporary privatization but rather to consign the lot
6. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023 (2013); Jon D.
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All the
President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 Calif. L. Rev.
901 (2008); Jon D. Michaels, Running the Government Like a Business . . . Then and Now, 128
Harv. L. Rev. 1152 (2015) (book review).
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to a prehistory in which the federal government was small, unprofessional,
and not particularly public spirited (pp. 27–31).
This passel of private operators grew obsolete, Michaels argues, with the
rising demand in the twentieth century for “big, good, and distinctive gov-
ernment” at the federal level (pp. 31–33). By the middle of the century, the
federal government boasted a “public workforce largely purged of its origi-
nal sins of partisanship, privatization, and profit-seeking” (p. 33) and stood
ready to tackle the many social and economic problems Americans wanted
their federal government to solve.7 The expanding federal government and
the administrative state necessary to accomplish its tasks admittedly repre-
sented an “abrupt break” (p. 39) from the earlier constitutional regime and
“was revolutionary in all respects” (p. 41). But Michaels is quick to insist
this expansion was not, in fact, a coup.
Rather, he contends that the administrative state settled into an equilib-
rium that adapted America’s core constitutional principles and extended
them to modern governance (p. 40). The critical new pillars of this new
regime were (i) the Pendleton Act, which created a professionalized, tenure-
protected bureaucracy staffed based on merit, not connections, and (ii) the
1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which “rationalized and stan-
dardized” agency rulemaking and adjudication (pp. 46, 70–72). These two
features, Michaels argues, are central to an “[a]dministrative [s]eparation of
[p]owers” that works a “[c]onstitutional [r]edemption” of the modern ad-
ministrative era (p. 57).
Michaels offers a reconstruction in which separation-of-powers princi-
ples deep within our constitutional DNA reexpress themselves in the appara-
tus of the administrative state.8 Agency leaders who answer to the president
are—literally—the administrative standard-bearers for the head of the exec-
utive branch.9 Standing in for the judicial branch, in an admittedly more
metaphorical fashion, are civil servants who enjoy tenured employment and
are insulated from politics as they go about their reasoned, steady applica-
tion of expertise to their legal mandate (pp. 66–67). Finally, civil society,
empowered through the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking proceed-
ings, plays the role of Congress, as its input helps shape the rules forged in
the interaction between presidential appointees and civil servants (pp. 62,
68). The APA’s promotion of civil society through legislative rulemaking and
the Pendleton Act’s promotion of the civil service would combine as
counterweights to the agency leaders whose authority derives from the
President.
While conceding that his analogies are imperfect, Michaels identifies a
“system of administrative powers to . . . channel and roughly reproduce the
constitutional rivalries” (p. 65) between the branches of government in our
7. P. 41. It is no coincidence that social trust in elites peaked just at this time.
8. P. 58 (citing Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103
Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 560 (2009)).
9. P. 59; see also p. 66 (same).
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Constitution,10 each reproducing the parallel tendencies toward executive
“efficiency, technocratic expertise, or civic republicanism” (p. 74). Rather
than enabling the tyrannical, regulatory steamrolling that haunts the fever
dreams of the administrative state’s critics, this new separation of powers
accommodates and balances plural interests and impulses (pp. 74–76).
Under this approach of “separation of powers all the way forward,”11
our constitutional order is not dead; it just has developed in a fashion that is
congruent with its original form but also is stronger, suppler, and thus bet-
ter adapted to the demands of modern governance. Ernst Haeckel’s theories
of organism development may be on the outs in biology, but here in the
ecosystem of administrative law, constitutional ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny.
But the pax administrativa was not fated to last. By Michaels’s account,
that era ranged roughly from the passage of the APA in 1946 until the wide-
spread loss of trust in government in the late 1970s.12 Michaels argues that
“the marriage of the American people to big government foundered” after
Vietnam, stagflation, public frustration with government inefficiency, and
the advocacy work of big business and law-and-economics scholars
(pp. 85–91). But this disenchantment did not lead to the reduction in fed-
eral government the Reagan Revolutionaries desired (p. 97). It turns out the
American people liked government programs, even if they did not like the
bureaucrats administering them.13
Enter privatization. Rather than trimming government services, succes-
sive administrations sought to trim the number of government workers pro-
viding those services—and make the remaining bureaucrats leaner and
meaner. The federal footprint expanded starting with the Reagan Adminis-
tration, and it grew with the Clinton Administration’s movement to
“reinvent government”14 and close the books on the “era of big govern-
ment,”15 even as the federal government outsourced more of its work to
contractors who, the theory goes, are more responsive to market discipline.
Michaels catalogues in an exhaustive, but not exhausting, fashion the num-
ber of federal tasks contracted out, including the setting of federal safety
standards and the interrogation of prisoners and enemy combatants abroad
10. The relationship between this system of administrative separation of powers and the
(original?) (actual?) Constitution is a question I will explore below.
11. P. 75 (emphasis omitted) (citing, by analogy, Heather K. Gerken, Foreward: Federal-
ism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2010)).
12. See pp. 70–72 (identifying the 1946 APA and the 1883 Pendleton Act as “supersta-
tutes” crucial to the pax administrativa); p. 84 (discussing the trust of “big, public govern-
ment” pervasive in the decades between the 1930s and 1960s).
13. Pp. 97, 99 (noting how Reagan was “[s]tymied by the American people’s refusal to
give up their government goodies”).
14. P. 98 (quoting Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government
that Works Better & Costs Less 6 (1993)).
15. P. 11 (quoting President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan.
23, 1996), https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html [https://
perma.cc/WFN9-8DZS]); see also pp. 101–02.
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(pp. 111–13). He also describes how the logic of the market crept into the
remaining bureaucracy with the reclassification of civil servants as at-will
employees and the introduction of other market-mimicking mechanisms
into administration (pp. 115–16), such as the CIA’s own venture capital
outfit (p. 109).
The result here is not the Deep State, though many contractors work for
it. Rather it is what we might call the Wide State—an expanded and ex-
panding federal government interpenetrated with, and partly concealed by,
its connections with the private sector.16 Michaels’s case against privatization
does not turn on its economizing benefits being oversold, though he is
happy to point you to literature arguing that.17 Rather, his complaint is that
expansive privatization undermines the precarious set of checks and bal-
ances we lucked into with the pax administrativa.18 Echoing formalist critics
of the administrative state, Michaels admonishes that a particular governing
mechanism’s efficiency does not assure its constitutionality.19
What are the constitutional problems with this neoliberal Leviathan?
The privatized para-state helps “consolidate, homogenize, and aggrandize
that which has been disaggregated, diversified, and hamstrung” (p. 128).
The biggest beneficiary of this disruption is the president. Agency heads and
the president to whom they answer do not have to allow tenured, bureau-
cratic sticks-in-the-mud to slow down their policy agenda when they can
hire “ ‘yes’ men and women” who go along so they can get along with the
next contract (pp. 128–29). Similarly, contracting “marginalizes public par-
ticipation in the administrative process,” as agency heads hire private con-
tractors who are more lightly regulated and harder for the public to monitor
and hold to account (p. 131). Privatization undermines two of the three
pillars of the pax administrativa,20 leaving the agency heads standing alone
amid a coterie of compliant contractors.21
Michaels dedicates the bulk of the book’s final part to restoring the ad-
ministrative balance of powers, where it falls to the courts to play the role of
Metternich.22 Taking a page from John Hart Ely, Michaels contends that
courts should focus on “reinforcing rivalrous administration.”23 If the court
is confident that agency action flows from an “administrative process” that is
16. See pp. 123–25 (describing how privatization can enable government growth).
17. See pp. 121 & 273 n.2.
18. E.g., p. 111.
19. P. 122 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (Burger, C.J.)) (noting that
such arguments “fail to reconcile this celebration of efficiency with an underlying constitu-
tional culture that is decidedly skeptical of efficiency arguments”); see also p. 122
(“[S]eparation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
20. See p. 72.
21. See pp. 135–36 (“[M]arketization opens the door to a neo-patronage era.”).
22. P. 177 (“I view the courts as most inclined to adopt a balance-of-power approach.”).
23. P. 180 (emphasis omitted) (citing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review (1980)).
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“basically sound,” it should largely or even completely abstain from review-
ing the merits (p. 180). On the other hand, if the court believes the agency
process was insufficiently “rivalrous, heterogeneous, and inclusive,” it should
reduce or eliminate deference on merits review (p. 181). Under this regime,
agencies that want to avoid substantive second-guessing by the courts would
restructure their policymaking procedures, a result that would uphold con-
stitutional values while getting judges out of the business of making hard,
substantive policy choices above their technical and political paygrade (pp.
182–87).
Michaels also proffers some stronger doctrinal medicine to revive the
administrative separation of powers. For example, he suggests that courts
might prohibit agencies from using contractors to exercise policymaking
functions or drop the presumption of regularity when the government uses
private deputies to project public power (p. 190). He also targets established
institutions like the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)
and independent agencies as inconsistent with the administrative separation
of powers (pp. 192–93). OIRA allows the White House to undo the delicate
regulatory compromises the three administrative “branches” struck in the
rulemaking process (pp. 192–93). Independent agencies, whose heads can-
not be removed except for cause, are run by officers who “cannot claim an
especially close connection or kinship to any of the constitutional branches”
(p. 194). These agencies are both too distant from the president and too
close to the bureaucracy, thus throwing the administrative separation of
powers out of balance.24
Finally, Michaels has a list of tasks for Congress as well. In addition to a
moratorium and claw back on contracting (pp. 207–09), Michaels borrows
from the playbook of the U.S. military to bolster the civil service’s prestige
and morale. He calls for an elite government service academy modeled on
West Point, a midcareer leadership academy, better pay, and a media cam-
paign to improve the repute of career civil servants (pp. 209–18). Michaels
also asks Congress to help cultivate what he calls “Virtual Civil Society” (p.
219). He would make it easier for citizens to know about and participate in
notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings: think supplementing the
Federal Register with banner ads about proceedings (pp. 220–21), providing
Facebook links to agency comment pages (p. 228), and offering more in-
person and online outreach by agency officials (pp. 219–29). These legisla-
tive measures, Michaels argues, would help strengthen a civil service and
civil society that has atrophied while agency heads have flexed their muscles
in recent decades (p. 211).
24. P. 195. Michaels notes, correctly, that his critique of independent agencies is different
from that of unitary executive theorists who also challenge their constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723–24, 724 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
that the Constitution requires that the president have plenary power to remove principal of-
ficers). Michaels requires not a unitary executive but a balanced administrative branch.
Pp. 195–96.
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II. The New Administrative Constitutionalism
Constitutional Coup offers a number of important contributions to
scholarship on the administrative state. I will focus on Michaels’s arguments
about constitutional law and administrative doctrine, but I do not wish to
downplay how much the book aids our understanding about the extent and
nature of privatization in contemporary governance. Michaels has written
extensively on this score,25 and Constitutional Coup synthesizes that work
and the wider body of literature into a lucid and trenchant narrative that is
essential reading for administrative law scholars. That contemporary picture,
painted with a thoughtful mix of scholarly analysis and memorable exam-
ples, is worth the price of purchase alone.
But the book is more than an explication of how much, as a factual
matter, the administrative state extends beyond the halls of the Pentagon
and the great agency buildings lining the National Mall. Rather, it links these
institutional developments with broader arguments about their legitimacy
under our constitutional and administrative law. Privatization may or may
not save the government money. Privatization may or may not be a bad
thing as a matter of general political theory. These are important arguments,
but Michaels is interested in how privatization measures up to our legal
commitments, and here he finds it sorely wanting (pp. 4–6).
In doing so, Michaels takes an approach that departs from familiar
functionalist and formalist constitutional arguments about the legitimacy of
the administrative state. This constitutional theory cuts serious ice regarding
contemporary doctrine and may even have more explanatory power than
the book claims. This theoretical tool is twin-edged, however, and can be
deployed against Michaels’s vision of the administrative state. Michaels’s ap-
plication, moreover, is also harder to square with administrative doctrine
than Constitutional Coup suggests. These objections are not necessarily fatal,
but they help us understand and evaluate the book’s normative commit-
ments and tee up broader questions about our administrative state’s consti-
tutional pedigree.
A. The Power of the Administrative Separation of Powers
Michaels renews and revives an important strain of constitutional argu-
ment about the legitimacy of the administrative state. As he notes, formalist
or libertarian critics of the administrative state have long developed original-
ist arguments against its legitimacy under our Constitution. While those
constitutional arguments have not curtailed the “rise and rise of the admin-
istrative state,”26 the “basis for this constitutional blessing was, and remains,
somewhat vague and slippery,” even for the new era’s champions (p. 55).
25. See supra note 6.
26. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231
(1994).
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Given Americans’ reverence of the founders and fidelity to all things consti-
tutional, merely pragmatic justifications of the administrative state cede the
high ground to legalist critics (pp. 55–57).
Michaels seeks to reclaim that territory with appeals that are more prin-
cipled than appeals to pragmatic necessity,27 more robust than judicial
minimalism,28 and less radical than asserting that the New Deal amended the
Constitution outside Article V.29 In doing so, he offers a Jack
Balkin–inspired defense of the administrative state that insists the fourth
branch of government is reconcilable with the original Constitution’s princi-
pled commitments to separation of powers and checks and balances.30 In its
application of separation-of-powers principles to entities within the fourth
branch, moreover, Michaels’s approach harkens to Heather Gerken’s exten-
sion of federalism principles to substate and sublocality entities in her work
on the New Nationalism.31
What we might call the Yale School of public law—which rejects formal
constitutional originalism while applying what it understands as the Consti-
tution’s core set of its animating principles—is a serious and important vein
of American constitutional law, even if one disagrees with it. Constitutional
Coup is a significant, creative, and careful application of this strain of theo-
rizing to administrative law.32 His approach also has an important, if oft-
overlooked, antecedent in the work of James M. Landis, who saw an inde-
pendent, professional bureaucracy as an important check against the
president.33
Michaels’s constitutional argument also offers important payoffs for ad-
ministrative law doctrine beyond the reforms he presses in his book. Con-
sider, for example, the courts’ loose treatment of the APA. It’s plausible, as
27. See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 1 (1938) (“[T]he administra-
tive process springs from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government to deal
with modern problems.”).
28. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Adminis-
trative State (2016) (describing how, in area after area, courts cede ground to administrative
agencies out of a recognition of limited judicial competence).
29. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 281–331 (1998).
30. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 3 (2011); Balkin, supra note 8, at 550
(describing “framework originalism,” which “views the Constitution as an initial framework
for governance that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time through constitu-
tional construction”).
31. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale
L.J. 1889 (2014); Gerken, supra note 11, at 8 (“[R]ecasting federalism as minority rule without
sovereignty would push federalism all the way down, turning our attention to the institutions
neglected by federalists and their localist counterparts.” (emphasis omitted)).
32. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Danger-
ous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2318 (2016) (proposing “a set of mechanisms that
create checks and balances within the executive branch”).
33. Landis, supra note 27, at 46 (explaining how “administrative power” can offset “ex-
ecutive power”). For an explication of this facet of Landis’s thought, see Adrian Vermeule,
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 Harv. L.
Rev. 2463 (2017).
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an original matter, that arbitrary-and-capricious review of policy decisions34
was supposed to resemble rational basis scrutiny; that the notice35 and the
statement-of-basis-and-purpose36 requirements in informal rulemaking did
not in fact require much explication by agencies; or that courts were sup-
posed to give little deference to agency interpretations of law,37 but review
findings of fact38 under the deferential jury standard.39 Anyone who has
taken a basic course in administrative law knows that this is not how the
doctrine has played out—and not because the courts think that the APA
means something different. In fact, the courts seem only intermittently in-
terested in the APA as an ordinary statute.40
Michaels’s argument from constitutional structure could provide a justi-
fication for this overlay of administrative common law.41 If, as Michaels ar-
gues, the APA is in fact a quasi-constitutional “superstatute” that both
instantiates and protects the administrative separation of powers (pp.
71–72), we should not be surprised or vexed when courts treat it as a source
of inspiration for doctrinal development, rather than a formal instruction
manual for running the bureaucracy. After all, for Michaels, that is how we
ought to interpret the original Constitution as well.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
35. Id. § 553(b)(1)–(3); see Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
D.C. Circuit’s doctrine imposing rigorous notice requirements “cannot be squared with the
text of § 553 of the APA”).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
37. Id. § 706 (“[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
all constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of agency action.”). See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to
Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017) (arguing that the APA incorporated a pre-
sumption of de novo review).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
39. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1998)
(Scalia, J.) (attempting to equate the standard of review for agency fact finding with the jury
standard).
40. But see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207, 1209–10 (2015) (re-
jecting heightened requirements for amendment of interpretive rules); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978) (same regarding
rulemaking notice).
41. Cf. Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 Fla. L. Rev.
1215, 1265 (2014) (“The unwritten [administrative] constitution theory thus clarifies that ad-
ministrative law ought to be governed by uniform principles created by federal sovereign au-
thorities, including federal courts.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreward, Embracing Administrative
Common Law, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1293, 1296 (2012) (“Administrative common law serves
an important function in our separation of powers system, a system that makes it difficult for
Congress or the [p]resident to oust the courts as developers of administrative law.”). But see
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113 (1998)
(arguing that the APA should displace administrative common law).
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Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s imposition of heightened, nonstatutory obliga-
tions on agencies in notice-and-comment rulemaking42 has constitutional
warrant, for it protects the participation of civil society in the administrative
process. Similarly, rather than blindly accepting de novo judicial review of
legal questions because that is what the APA requires,43 we can calibrate
standards of review to ensure a proper balance of administrative powers.44
And, while one might object that “hard look” review of agency policy deci-
sions45 would surprise the drafters of the APA, it may be justified as a bul-
wark in the administrative separation of powers: requiring an agency to offer
a reasoned, cogent explanation for its decisions ensures that the participa-
tion of civil society in the administrative process is meaningful and makes it
harder for politicized agency heads to bypass inconvenient truths offered by
expert civil servants.46 These positions may or may not be good administra-
tive policy, but under Michaels’s framework, what matters most is that they
are the outputs of good constitutional law.47
42. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2267 (2001)
(discussing the “paper hearing” that includes “extensive and often repeated notice to affected
groups of a proposed rule, provision to them of the factual and analytical material supporting
it, and detailed responses to any group’s adverse comment or alternative proposal”). This
justification would be in addition to the standard explanation that a robust notice and rea-
soned explanation requirement makes judicial review possible. See Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting that the reasoned explanation require-
ment of arbitrary-and-capricious review facilitates APA review, rather than adding extras-
tatutory requirements).
43. See Duffy, supra note 41, at 192 (challenging deference on the grounds that “Chevron
is actually an aggressive fashioning of judge-made law by the Court”).
44. See chapter 9 (proposing that deference be adjusted based on whether the agency
process respected separation of powers).
45. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“If satisfied
that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the
court will uphold its findings . . . .”).
46. See p. 182 (noting instances where the Court displaced decisions based on the “con-
cern that agency leaders were making decisions not clearly supported by the best scientific
evidence (but instead seemed motivated largely by political considerations)”).
47. In this respect, the unceremonious death the Supreme Court dealt to formal
rulemaking in Florida East Coast Railway may be unremarkable, even if the decision reflected a
misunderstanding of the original understanding of the APA. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast
Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 242–46 (1973); Kent Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal
Rulemaking, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 1, 8–10 (2017), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/02/85-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.-Arguendo-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJF9-HHGC]
(explaining how the Court’s gutting of formal rulemaking reflected unfamiliarity with the legal
conventions at the time of the APA). As Barnett notes, “[f]ormal rulemaking is the platypus of
administrative law” that combines oral hearings and adjudication with rulemaking. Id. at 5.
Importantly for our purposes, it does not include as wide a swath of civil society as notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Thus, its demise would do little to upset Michaels’s administrative
separation of powers. In fact, informal rulemaking’s inclusiveness would be preferable.
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B. Administrative Separation of Powers—Another View of the Cathedral
Even if we take Michaels’s approach to constitutional interpretation for
granted, his method could lead to reconstructions of constitutional law
which suggest broad privatization is well within our legal tradition. I sketch
these alternatives not because they are normatively superior or knockdown
interpretations of the facts, but rather to highlight some of the challenges of
Michaels’s method and to burrow down to the normative core of his
argument.
First, we might question whether, under Michaels’s approach to consti-
tutional construction, privatization is an unlawful interloper. Anticipating
this objection, Michaels is careful to explore the long period of the govern-
ment’s deputation of public functions to private actors.48 Having done so,
however, he dismisses it as part of the republic’s Neanderthal phase in which
the federal government was not particularly large or particularly public.49
Nevertheless, it is not so easy not to draw a neat line between constitutional
prehistory and the post-New Deal pax administrativa. Michaels’s story about
checks and balances within the administrative state is plausible, but it’s not
the only one we could extract from the data.
Consider an alternative along Michaels’s methodological lines. Prior to
the twentieth century, the federal government, ever solicitous to the liberty-
enhancing benefits of private ordering, was careful to ensure that even its
few, critical tasks, such as law enforcement touching on interstate matters
(Pinkertons), national security (privateers), and revenue collection (tax fer-
rets), were outsourced to private actors (pp. 29–32). This represents a prin-
ciple in favor of making government as private as possible, one we could
carry forward to today. Yes, we want the federal government to do much
more than be the night watchman state it offered in 1789, but the precise
means of doing so are underdetermined. The best reconciliation of the de-
sire for a more activist government with our constitutional tradition of lim-
ited federal power could be creating a government sphere that looks as much
as possible like the market that it would otherwise displace or correct. Wide-
spread private contracting and market-mimicking devices within the bu-
reaucracy carry the separation of the private sector and the federal
government “all the way forward,” so to speak (p. 24).
To be sure, the argument continues, unelected, tenured civil servants
played a larger role between the 1930s and 1970s. It may also be true that in
pre-twentieth century government the “public sphere was not very public,
and the private sphere was not nearly as private” (p. 35). Perhaps, but the
move to privatization—using market-based solutions and actors to achieve
public ends while also endowing ostensibly private actors with public tasks
and values—may simply be a return to form that happens to be less public
48. See chapter 1.
49. See p. 39 (“[T]he bounty hunters of the Wild West and the swashbuckling privateers
of the high seas must have seemed as remote to, say, the New Deal brain trust and Ken-
nedy–Johnson whiz kids as cavemen were to the Greeks and Romans of antiquity.”).
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spirited than Michaels would like. But if we are looking for patterns in the
229 years of constitutional data, it is the heretofore unidentified and now-
lapsing pax administrativa that is the forty-year exception that needs ex-
plaining. Today’s age of privatization may just be, like Michaels’s own theory
of the administrative separation of powers, an extension and adaption of
earlier, core constitutional commitments to a new setting and new tasks.50
Alternatively, one could construct a constitutional justification for wider
privatization based on effectiveness, not limited federal power. Against lim-
ited government originalists, advocates of the administrative state like James
Landis argued that a small, divided, hamstrung, and hesitant federal govern-
ment could not grapple with the large, consolidated, nimble, and decisive
businesses that wielded great social power in America.51 Formalist propo-
nents of limited federal government lost the argument because, as Michaels
explains, people simply wanted the federal government to do more, which
was impracticable to accomplish under the old separation of powers (p. 2).
Streamlined governance delegated into the hands of focused, politically
accountable executives is simply just the next step down the road in the logic
of effectiveness that gave rise to the administrative state. Just as Landis
thought our old, limited, tripartite federal government had to contend with
powerful businesses with one hand tied behind its back, the contemporary
privatization advocate could argue that today’s regulated entities are even
more nimble and dynamic than those of yesteryear. The policy problems
agencies seek to solve today are also more complex and fluid than ever. Forc-
ing the government to march through the reticulated procedures Michaels
demands (pp. 219–30) is like asking a 1950s middle management team at
IBM to design the next killer app. No wonder the administrative state has
concluded that a more networked, cooperative matrix of private contractors
and politically responsive agency heads is a better way to accomplish policy
goals than running decisions through a veto gate patrolled by stiff-necked
civil servants.
This more flexible stance also squares with existing doctrine that is
harder to fit with Michaels’s approach. He recognizes that some of his pro-
posals are in tension with Vermont Yankee, which holds that courts are not
free to supplement the requirements of the APA.52 We could add to that list.
The constitutional valence he gives to notice-and-comment rulemaking (pp.
220–24) is in tension with the wide discretion agencies have to choose be-
tween adjudication, which engages a smaller swath of the public, and
50. Cf. pp. 57–58 (describing an interregnum period where “administrative powers . . .
started off so dangerously consolidated and unchecked” only to “become disaggregated,” thus
restoring the “framers’ checks and balances”).
51. See Landis, supra note 27, at 10–12 (“If in private life we were to organize a unit for
the operation of an industry, it would scarcely follow Montesquieu’s lines. . . . [I]t is only
intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than the political analogue.”).
52. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525
(1978).
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rulemaking.53 It is in similar tension with the discretion most courts give
agencies to opt for informal adjudication,54 which requires fewer procedures
and leaves decisionmakers less insulated from political control than formal
adjudication.55 In fact, notice-and-comment rulemaking, so central to
Michaels’s vision of ideal administrative constitutionalism, did not even be-
gin in earnest until the 1960s and did not reach its apogee until the 1970s.56
If the late sixties and early seventies were the beginning of the end of
Michaels’s pax administrativa, his golden age was very brief indeed.
To justify this new arrangement, one can adopt the forgiving, well-es-
tablished functionalism that finds Congress’s arrangements of powers con-
stitutional so long as there is a tolerable overall balance of powers among the
branches.57 This kind of functionalism, which focuses on the actual branches
in the Constitution—rather than those branch’s avatars in Michaels’s ad-
ministrative constitution (pp. 111–12)—is slow to question concentrations
of power in the hands of the executive, so long as they are the product of
Congressional delegation, as opposed to aggrandizement.58 Congress can al-
ways choose to delegate less, require less privatization, or strengthen proce-
dures. It has chosen not to, and so long as the ultimate legislative power
resides in Congress and a politically accountable executive blesses privatiza-
tion, the current state Michaels bemoans is no less constitutional than the
broad delegations to the more bureaucratic pax administrativa.
53. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947). Michaels contends that the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), incentivizes
agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking because it links deferential judicial
review to procedural formality. See pp. 183–84. If Mead has such effects, it would bring
Michaels’s broader argument in closer line with existing practice, though the empirical data is
unclear on this point. Michaels cites a 2017 study showing agencies are more likely to win
under deferential review. See id. at 183 (citing Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chev-
ron in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2017)). It is unclear how much the trend that
recent study identifies has pressed agencies toward rulemaking on the margin, where they
trade off increased likelihood of success before the courts against the burdens of rulemaking.
Were the incentive very powerful, Michaels would have had less need to write his book.
54. See, e.g., Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st
Cir. 2006) (joining the majority of circuits that give agencies such a choice).
55. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1383, 1391 & nn.18–19 (2004) (identifying the procedural differences between informal and
formal adjudication).
56. See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in
the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1145–49 (2001) (cataloging the dominance of
adjudicative policymaking until the 1960s and the subsequent rise of rulemaking).
57. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 518 (1987); see also Harold J.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1253, 1255
(1988) (“The functionalists . . . generally ask whether the exercise of the contested function by
one branch impermissibly intrudes into the core function or domain of the other branch.”).
58. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (delegation constitutional in
part because it does not involve aggrandizing powers); cf. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (finding no separation-of-powers problem in
significant part because “this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional
power at the expense of a coordinate branch”).
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Against such functionalism, traditional formalists object that you can
have separation-of-powers problems even without aggrandizement; it’s just
as bad for Congress to give away legislative power as it is to usurp the execu-
tive’s.59 But such an objection is rooted in a (nonliving) originalism and
formalism that these more permissive functionalists reject60 and that
Michaels does not embrace. It is all well and good to cite, as Michaels does,
the Federalist Papers and Supreme Court decisions extolling the impractical
virtues of separated powers as a check on tyranny.61 But one wonders why
such appeals do not apply with equal force, if not more, with respect to the
original, impractical constitutional regime we scuttled nearly one hundred
years ago. If you already deposed the king, why tolerate the rule of his simi-
larly ineffectual heir?
Michaels would because he, like other more formalist critics of adminis-
trative expediency, sees the impracticality of separated powers as a feature,
not a bug (p. 57). Although he eschews the restrictions of formalist original-
ism, he seeks to carry through our founding commitments to separated
powers as faithfully as possible (p. 163). Furthermore, he sees independent
value in the separation of powers, which encourage deliberative, careful, and
consensual governance in a large, pluralistic republic (p. 64). These commit-
ments help us understand and assess Michaels’s rejections of alternative con-
structions of our Constitution. Even if other narratives find a foothold in
our constitutional history, Michaels’s argument turns on separation-of-pow-
ers principles offering a normatively superior fit compared to theories that
celebrate private ordering or efficient policymaking. Michaels could be justi-
fied in pressing separation-of-powers principles forward if they bore supe-
rior moral weight to the alternatives. But do they?
III. The Continuing Value of Separated Powers
The central question is whether Michaels’s modern iteration of sepa-
rated powers offers a “Goldilocks solution” to modern governance or the
worst of both worlds. If the former, it can explain “how pax administrativa is
neither too unfettered nor too hamstrung—but rather just right” (p. 52). If
the latter, we get much of Tocqueville’s nightmare62—expanded, centralized
59. Arnold I. Burns & Stephen J. Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 Pace
L. Rev. 575, 580 (1987) (denying that “an acquiescence in an unconstitutional exercise of
power by another branch establish that power in the other branch”).
60. See Strauss, supra note 57, at 493 (“If in 1787 such a merger of function was unthink-
able, in 1987 it is unavoidable given Congress’s need to delegate at some level the making of
policy for a complex and interdependent economy, and the equal incapacity (and undesirabil-
ity) of the courts to resolve all matters appropriately characterized as involving ‘adjudication.’
A formal theory of separation of powers that says these functions cannot be joined is
unworkable.”).
61. See, e.g., pp. 7, 122.
62. Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State
Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (2014); see 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
America 272 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1862) (predict-
ing that if centralized administration came to the United States “in such a republic a more
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power that destroys republican forms and spirit—and lose the efficiencies
that made the gambit worth considering in the first place.
To answer that, we should consider more closely the analogues Michaels
has stand in for the original branches in his administrative constitution.
Michaels does not seek a perfect translation between the original Constitu-
tion and his separation of powers. Rather he seeks to reconstruct the “kinds
of legal, democratic, and professional interests, commitments, and ap-
proaches that Madison and his colleagues pitted against one another in the
constitutional arena” (pp. 65–66). No analogy is perfect, but the question is
whether the dissimilarities concern essential or accidental features of the
original.
Consider his argument that agency heads stand in for the president. The
claim that such readily removable officers are a proxy for the president is
straightforward. What’s more contestable is his understanding of what the
presidency is for. For Michaels, agency heads set the policy agenda, albeit
filtered, checked, and informed by the civil servants and civil society. This
reflects the standard arrangements today in which the president is the na-
tional head of a party and directs the legislative agenda of a quiescent, di-
vided, or dithering Congress. But let us not confuse our modern
understanding with that of the framers, who rejected a king and envisioned
Congress setting the nation’s policy agenda.63 There are normative argu-
ments in favor of a strong presidency—only the president has a national
mandate, only the president can forge the coherent policy proposals active
national government requires, etc.—but they are the arguments of those
who constructed the administrative state and rejected the framers’ under-
standing of our constitutional structure.64 They are also the very types of
pragmatic arguments that open the door to privatization as an effective way
to get the nation’s work done.
Michaels embraces the framers’ belief that principal officers should be
responsible to the president, but accepts a far broader understanding of the
president’s role in domestic policy. He seeks to tame that tiger by checking
its agents within the administrative state, primarily through limiting priva-
tization, which strengthens the agency heads to the detriment of the other
insufferable despotism would prevail than in any of the absolute monarchies of Europe”),
quoted in Ernst, supra at 1.
63. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render
them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with
each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the
society will admit.”).
64. See Frohnen & Carey, supra note 2, at 118 (noting that with the rise of progressive
era administrative thought “another principle . . . emerged and soon came to be regarded as
axiomatic, namely, that democratic accountability requires centralization of authority”); id. at
129 (characterizing Woodrow Wilson as rejecting “the Framers’ vision of separation of powers
and the very idea of overlapping jurisdictions in favor of a top-down, monarchical system of
public administration”).
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pillars of the administrative constitution: the bureaucracy and civil society.65
It is unclear, however, whether his administrative iterations of Congress and
the judiciary can counter the agents of the actual, supercharged president.
Consider the role of civil society, which for Michaels stands in for Con-
gress and will limit the authority of agency leadership (p. 68). Even if, as
Michaels contends, public comment has a substantial effect on policy forma-
tion (p. 62), we again recapitulate the inversion of the framers’ vision in
which Congress was supposed to set the agenda, subject only to presidential
approval. For the most part, civil society responds to rulemaking notices or
enforcement orders, rather than present proposals or “override” the admin-
istration’s veto of their concerns. Unlike Congress, which is able to engage in
self-protection, civil society’s influence depends on litigants’ ability to con-
vince a court that an agency decision did not give adequate consideration of
their beef and thus is arbitrary and capricious under the APA (p. 182).
Furthermore, there is a world of difference between representative, re-
publican government and the flash mob of Facebook “likes” and emails
Michaels sees standing in for Congress in modern government (pp. 68,
219–20). The task of forging those cacophonous comments into concrete
policy proposals falls not to a pluralistic, representative legislative body, but
rather to the unitary president’s agency heads and politically unaccountable
civil servants. One is as much a supplicant as a citizen. And, while we de-
spair of the farces we see on C-SPAN, equating the role of representative
government to posting in the administrative state’s comments section hardly
feels like self-governance. At best, it is a town hall of world historic propor-
tions, where voices are heard only when many yell in unison.66
In this light, privatization’s hollowing of the administrative public
sphere does not seem so great a loss. In fact, Michaels’s take on public par-
ticipation eerily resembles the mass market mechanisms that drive privatiza-
tion. Given our Bowling Alone political culture,67 civil society’s participation
in governance in Michaels’s administrative separation of powers will likely
consist of a mass of individuals—alone together, or loosely affiliated at
best—trying to convince a large, consolidated decisionmaking entity to cater
to their tastes. We settle for Silicon Valley’s vision of governance, in which
the public agenda and Twitter’s “Trends for You” merge into an alienated,
late capitalist simulacrum of the agora.
Michaels’s translation between the judiciary and civil service is equally
fraught. He rightly picks up on the independence, professionalism, and ded-
ication to craft that characterizes the ideal types within both institutions
(pp. 66–67). But, as Michaels notes, things get a little tricky after that. The
framers’ view of the judiciary turned on a vision that can look embarrass-
ingly idealistic to postrealist eyes. Publius famously claimed that courts
“must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise
65. See pp. 202–03.
66. See p. 73. But see p. 162 (invoking the New England town hall meeting).
67. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Ameri-
can Community (2001).
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WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substi-
tution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”68 Some have even
argued that this combination of tenure protection, electoral insulation, and
prioritization of judgment over will entails a principle of strict adherence to
institutional precedent.69
Strict adherence to institutional precedent is not something that
Michaels thinks civil servants can or even should do. They have “broad dis-
cretion” to make enforcement decisions, have “considerable leeway” when
administering benefit programs, and even can push back against the policies
of an administration, as evidenced by selective leaks and rogue tweeting by
the bureaucratic #resistance to an administration (p. 61). If civil servants use
these powers to be “potentially formidable counterweights, quite capable of
shaping administrative policy” (p. 61), we are much closer to the realm of
will rather than legal judgment. Nor will this counterweight be without bias.
If, as Michaels accedes (pp. 61–62), civil servants as a class are more inclined
to support an activist government and an expanded regulatory mission, an
emboldened bureaucracy will be a turbo booster for some administrations
and a drag for others.70 In this light, privatization does not seem so bad:
contractors may be sellouts to the president, but at least the president an-
swers to the electorate, while the bureaucratic policymakers answer to
nobody.
One way for Michaels’s analogy to work more tightly would be to accept
the early Progressives’ long-discarded belief that policy formulation and im-
plementation are neatly separable. Rather than that, Michaels drops the Fed-
eralist’s faith in the declaratory theory of law and explains that judges and
bureaucrats alike must “wade into countless political thickets” and neither
can stand aloof “calling balls and strikes” (p. 67). Though both groups’ po-
litical commitments shape the way they do their jobs, they share a “commit-
ment to rationality, employing reason-giving processes to explain and
legitimate their at times countermajoritarian interventions” (p. 67). In short,
we have made Publius palatable for a Legal Process world.71
Yet Hart and Sachs still might balk. The analogy works best for adminis-
trative adjudication by tenure-protected officials, which is but a slice of all
adjudication (and subject to review by agency heads). But civil servants are
more than judges who happen to have particularized technical expertise in a
field. Beyond the adjudicators who also have part-time policymaking roles,
68. The Federalist, supra note 63, No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally Philip
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (2008).
69. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Design, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2018) (on file with author).
70. Private contractors also favor a large regulatory footprint, p. 45, but they are also
easier to get rid of than tenured civil servants, see Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 239 n.3
(5th Cir. 1975) (“Probationary employees are not afforded the greater procedural advantages
available to tenured federal employees.”).
71. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
976 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:959
other civil servants’ full-time jobs are serving as policy shop planners or
regulatory prosecutors.72 In this respect, their role is far closer to executive or
legislative will than legal judgment.
This point is not merely a formal one. Rather, even a Legal Process
thinker amenable to softening the lines between law and policy would admit
that adjudication is different than other forms of legal ordering, such as
legislating, negotiating, or enforcing the law.73 These different forms require
different “kinds of legal, democratic, and professional interests, commit-
ments, and approaches” (p. 65) than even nonidealized adjudication, and
civil servants play a hand in all of these functions. Michaels’s treatment of
the bureaucracy suggests a check against agency heads by a group whose
mission and politics have of a technocratic, mandarin orientation. If this is
an analogy to the judiciary, it is a controversial one that keeps the protec-
tions of judicial duty while assigning its bearers very different and more
expansive duties.
Even were the civil service an apt analogue, it too depends on the actual
judiciary for its continuing force. As Michaels explains, the civil service has
withered as both Congress and the president have sidelined politically un-
popular bureaucrats, most significantly through privatization of decision-
making. For this reason, Michaels seeks judicial protection of the
bureaucracy through the carrots and sticks of standards of review. Here, the
vulnerable state of the bureaucracy under his administrative constitution re-
calls the posture of the judiciary in our original Constitution: only constitu-
tional culture and the courts’ prestige kept the other branches from ignoring
their orders. The roots of that constitutional culture, however, tapped into
the notion that judicial duty flowed from legal judgment, not political will.
If that legitimating source of independence is precarious in a postrealist age,
it is all the more endangered for civil servants who roam the fields of poli-
cymaking without any rhetorical camouflage. Hence the double challenge of
Michaels asking unelected, tenured judges to protect unelected, tenured
policymakers against contractors who often serve at the pleasure of the
president.
Michaels must therefore reconsolidate power within the hands of the
actual judicial branch. With the administrative state causing congressional
atrophy, we are left with two branches jostling for power, with an ascendant
president pointing to a political mandate and the judiciary relying on ambi-
tious and novel constitutional arguments to justify its ongoing interventions.
This might not end well.74 In fact, given that Landis also envisioned the
72. Cf. p. 199 (describing the varied roles played by the SEC and other independent
agencies).
73. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 354
(1978).
74. Perhaps Congress would have a greater appetite for strengthening the civil service as
Michaels recommends in his tenth chapter, though he admits that his measures are “likely to
be unpopular, expensive, and at odds with their own self-interests.” P. 202.
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bureaucracy checking a politically powerful president, we might have already
seen this movie.75
It’s worth noting that the Pax Romana, which inspires the name of
Michaels’s pax administrativa, only occurred after the fall of the Roman Re-
public and the rise of the Roman Empire, which maintained the rhetoric
and institutional labels of the old regime while expanding under centralized
power.76 An originalist could argue that the framers recognized, in part from
the lesson of Rome, that the republic-preserving play of ambition against
ambition only works when each contender has self-sustaining power to
bring into balance. Within the fourth branch, nice abstractions and pleas to
the judiciary or an uninterested legislature only go so far, especially once we
have accepted the logic of centralized effectiveness that led to the abandon-
ment of our original, limited, and designedly clumsy framework of govern-
ment. Once we give up that frame, the empire of expediency reigns supreme,
leading to the privatization and marketization Michaels dreads without in-
stitutional checks robust enough to halt its march.
Conclusion
Michaels’s administrative separation of powers may not sufficiently in-
stantiate the values that led the framers to prefer divided government over
consolidation in the first place. If we want separation of powers, we might be
better off going with Constitution Classic rather than Michaels’s version of
the New Coke.77 Many functionalists or those who otherwise think our orig-
inal, limited constitutional order is worth discarding would be little troubled
by the objections just voiced above. And surely the measure of a book is not
whether it satisfies the criteria of a methodology it does not claim. Having
offered both functionalist78 and formalist79 critiques of Michaels’s theory, it
is worth concluding with an appreciation of what his argument offers even
to those wary of his constitutional theory.
Michaels’s work should give pause to the standard administrative law
constitutional functionalist. He offers powerful reasons why aggrandizement
of power within the executive is troublesome, even if Congress consents.
While, like Hamburger and Lawson, Michaels laments a lost golden age of
administrative law, he does not ground his arguments on strictly originalist,
formalist premises, nor does he sound a libertarian elegy for the night
75. Vermeule, supra note 33, at 2467–70 (discussing Landis’s theory of separation of
powers).
76. See Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic 308 (W.J. Smyth
trans., Polity Press 2007) (2002) (“[T]he names of the Republican offices had remained the
same, but the essence of their functions had passed to Augustus.”); id. (“The official justifica-
tion of the extraordinary legal position held by Augustus was the unusual challenges which
could not be solved by means of the regular magistracies of the Republic . . . .”).
77. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Ad-
ministrative Law, 2015 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
78. See supra Section II.B.
79. See supra Part III.
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watchman state. To the contrary, he argues that the received wisdom of liv-
ing constitutionalism is insufficiently progressive.
Michaels indicates that the functionalism that reigns supreme over
mainstream administrative constitutionalism, which is among other things a
justification of the modern federal regulatory state, is insufficiently nuanced
in attending to the separation-of-powers values it ostensibly seeks to defend.
And he changes the game by contending that more detailed attention to
separation of powers is not the sole preserve of bow-tied Federalist Paper
fanboys. He contends that smart, responsive, big government demands a
more sophisticated functionalism that looks under the hood of the executive
branch, for consolidation there abets the colonization of the executive
branch by a market ideology that undermines public values. In other words,
a subtler accounting of separation of powers within the administrative state
will ensure a non-originalist interpretation does not aid and abet the ne-
oliberal takeover of progressive administrative constitutionalism.
Originalists will not be satisfied with Michaels’s prescriptions, but that
does not mean they should ignore them, either. The first reason is a matter
of principle: however imperfect his take on separation of powers, he takes
them seriously—and more seriously than most defenders of the modern ad-
ministrative state. Even if the originalist critic is to dismiss Michaels’s argu-
ment, she has to up her game to do so. It is too easy for originalists, like
myself, to consider non-originalist alternatives as a constitutional match of
tennis with the net down, in which most anything is in bounds unless it goes
over the fence.80 Michaels challenges that facile construal, deriving from his
constitutional theory real and often demanding limits on administrative
doctrine.
The second reason is practical: Michaels is likely right that Americans
are unwilling to give up the benefits offered by a centralized federal govern-
ment. For better or worse, the Republic’s constitution—in the classical sense
of disposition or inclination—has largely departed from a Tocquevillian
faith that social problems are best tended to at the direction of civil society
or local or state government.81 For that reason, Congress is unlikely to dis-
mantle the present dispensation, and today’s polity would probably view
radical judicial surgery on the administrative state as constitutional
malpractice.
If there is little appetite for a return to the old regime, the question for
originalists remains whether meaningful separation of powers is possible in
our polity today. Perhaps, and most radically, they could draw on the nega-
tive lessons of the EU and conclude that the United States is simply too large
a polity to provide both self-government and the regulation and services
people demand of the state. If so, originalists might seek solidarity and sub-
sidiarity through a far more radical federalism or even a new constitutional
convention. Or the age’s dissenters could be more incrementalist, asking that
constitutional law’s accommodation of the administrative state go this far
80. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
81. See Frohnen & Carey, supra note 2, at 88–89.
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and no further, while trying to start discussions and win arguments about
the scope and division of public authority.
Those in the incrementalist resistance might consider pursuing some of
Michaels’s policies against privatizing even if, or especially if, the results are
less efficient. If, for now, we must have a powerful, centralized administra-
tive state, we could at least make it slow and internally conflicted.82 The days
of horse-and-buggy federal government are gone, the originalist concedes,
but at least Michaels wants to run the new juggernaut with an old transmis-
sion. As policy aspirations stall in the administrative process, we might even
find Congress deciding to make more decisions on its own, or states and
local communities engaging in their own experiments.
To shift metaphors from the automotive to the monstrous, one could
think that even if Michaels’s Leviathan is too large and too unaccountable, it
is more public and transparent than the present alternative and its shadowy,
privatized appendages. We can at least “count his teeth and claws, and see
just what is his strength.”83 Whether we want to “kill” the beast or “tame
him and make him a useful animal,”84 a good first step is taking that inven-
tory free of the false accounting the quasi-private administrative state en-
ables. That, at least, could be a start.
Altogether, Constitutional Coup offers a fresh take on the important
public question of privatization and does so in a way that departs from the
usual grooves of argument between originalist critics and functionalist de-
fenders of the administrative state. Not bad for 297 pages of clear, lively
prose. I recommend reading them.
82. Cf. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 Mo. L. Rev. 1075, 1083–85 (2016)
(“If you cannot ‘starve the beast,’ you can at least make it run uphill.”).
83. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
84. Id.
